Abstract. A generalization of the Möbius transform of games with finitely many players is introduced for games on MV-algebras. The variety of MValgebras subsumes most coalition models. We characterize the class of games for which the generalized Möbius transform exists. An application of the proposed transform to a Cimmino-type algorithm is shown for the core solution in games with finitely-many players.
Introduction
The Möbius transform, which originated in the work of Rota [Rot64] , was introduced to deal with problems in combinatorics and number theory. The scope of its applications is, however, very broad, so one of the areas in which it is used extensively is coalition game theory or theory of non-additive set functions in general. Since coalition games in the classical setting of games with finitely many players [PS07] are just set functions on the algebra of all subsets, we will prefer the shorter term "game" instead of "set function". The Möbius transform of a game is an equivalent representation of the game such that this representation can be viewed as an additive set function defined on a much larger algebra than the original game. This point of view is not so illuminating when processing games with finitely many players, yet its underlying idea enables extensions of the Möbius transform to games on infinite sets [Sch86, Den97] . There are numerous fields and results intertwining with the theory of the Möbius transform: the theory of integral representations of Choquet [Cho54] , Stone's representation theorem for Boolean algebras or random set theory [Mol05] . A comprehensive account of these aspects can be found in [Mol05, Chapter 1].
The main goal of this paper is to show that the Möbius transform can be naturally generalized to games on MV-algebras [CDM00] . Most algebraic structures used for modeling coalitions in coalition game theory, such as Boolean algebras of sets [PS07, AS74] or particular families of real-valued functions [Aub74, BK93] , are special cases of MV-algebras ("many-valued"-algebras). It was Dan Butnariu who envisioned the study of games on MV-algebras already in the book [BK93] , and who further encouraged the author to pursue the study of games in the manyvalued settings.
While Boolean algebras give semantics to the classical two-valued logic, MValgebras are the algebras of Lukasiewicz infinite-valued logic [CDM00, Chapter 4]. It was argued in [Kro09] that the idea of many-valued coalitions fits within the framework of coalition game theory. We will give the necessary background on MValgebras in Section 2.1. The essential tool in investigating the generalized Möbius transform and the solution of games is the concept of measure (or state) introduced in [Mun95] . As a matter of fact, the notion of measure on an MV-algebra is just an "integral" extension of the notion of Borel measure -see Theorem 2.10 in Section 2.2.
Section 3 contains the main result (Theorem 3.5), which singles out the class of MV-algebras and games for which the generalized Möbius transform exists. This result is preceded by the motivation leading to the introduction of the MV-algebra of all continuous functions over the space of compact subsets on which the Möbius transform should be defined: this construction is in line with the idea of the Möbius transform in the Boolean setting. Results similar to those in Section 3 appear in [Sch86] and [Den97] but it is rather difficult to compare them directly since there are essential differences in their basic settings. Indeed, the most important point of dissimilarity is that we always work with a particular set of continuous functions over a compact Hausdorff space. The tools and techniques of random set theory and Choquet integration [Mol05] lie at the heart of the proof of Theorem 3.5. In particular, the fundamental Choquet-Matheron-Kendall theorem [Mol05, Theorem 1.13] is used to establish the assertion of Theorem 3.5(ii).
In Section 4 we will show that the information provided by the generalized Möbius transform can be used for recovering elements of cores of games on MValgebras by a Cimmino-type algorithm. The core of a game (Definition 4.1) is one of the basic solution concepts in coalition game theory. In [BK09] , Butnariu and the author designed an iterative procedure to recover the core elements. This procedure is based on the Cimmino-type projection algorithm introduced by Butnariu and Shklyar in [BS08] . The so-called coalitional assessment of a given game (Definition 4.2), which is a crucial input parameter of the procedure, can be easily derived from the generalized Möbius transform of a particular class of games (Theorem 4.4).
Preliminaries
Basic definitions and results concerning MV-algebras are recalled in Section 2.1. Measures on MV-algebras will be briefly introduced in Section 2.2. The interested reader is referred to the book [CDM00] and Chapter 22 in [BW02] for further details.
MV-algebras.
Definition 2.1. An MV-algebra is an algebra M, ⊕, ¬, 0 with a binary operation ⊕, a unary operation ¬ and a constant 0 such that M, ⊕, 0 is an abelian monoid and the following equations hold true for every a, b ∈ M : ¬¬a = a,
On every MV-algebra M, we define 1 = ¬0,
For any two elements a, b ∈ M , we write a ≤ b if ¬a ⊕ b = 1. The relation ≤ is in fact a partial order. Further, the operations ∨, ∧ defined by
respectively, make the algebraic structure M, ∧, ∨, 0, 1 into a distributive lattice with bottom element 0 and top element 1. Definition 2.4. Let X be a nonempty set. A clan over X is a collection M X of functions X → [0, 1] such that the zero function 0 is in M X and the following conditions are satisfied:
Example 2.2 (Algebra of sets). Every Boolean algebra A of subsets of a set X is an MV-algebra in which
In particular, a clan M X contains the constant function 1 and it is closed with respect to the operation and thus every clan is an MV-algebra. Interestingly, most mathematical structures for modeling coalitions of players are captured by clans. Suppose that X is a set of players. If X is finite, then the algebra A = 2 X of all subsets of X is the classical framework used in coalition game theory -see, for instance, [PS07] . This setting can be further generalized in a few directions.
The coalition structures in the form of the MV-algebra [0, 1] X with X finite were investigated by Aubin [Aub74] under the name "games with fuzzy coalitions". Relaxing the finiteness assumption, Aumann and Shapley [AS74] investigated games on the Borel measurable subsets of the player set X = [0, 1]. They also came up with the idea of many-valued coalitions under the name of "ideal coalitions", which they identified with Borel measurable functions X → [0, 1]. Butnariu and Klement [BK93] focused on games defined on so-called tribes. A tribe over X is a clan M X closed with respect to countable (pointwise) suprema of its elements:
In this contribution, we will focus on the class of so-called semisimple MV-algebras, which subsumes all the algebraic structures mentioned above for modeling coalitions.
Let
We say that a proper filter is maximal whenever it is not strictly included in any proper filter. Let X M be the set of all maximal filters in M . It can be shown that X M = ∅. The set X M can be endowed with a topology whose family of closed sets is given by all sets Without loss of generality, every semisimple MV-algebra can be thought of as a separating clan M X of continuous functions over a compact Hausdorff space X and vice versa. Thus semisimple MV-algebras can be viewed as common generalizations of coalition structures provided that the set of players is identified with the compact Hausdorff space X. Equipping the set of players X with a topology is not unusual in game theory. For instance, Aumman and Shapley [AS74] assume that X is a Polish space or the real unit interval [0, 1]. If a ∈ M X is a coalition and x ∈ X is a player, then the continuity of a means that the degrees of membership a(y) of the players y ∈ X do not change abruptly when y is sufficiently close to x.
Let M X be a separating clan of continuous functions over a compact Hausdorff space X. There exists a one-to-one correspondence between certain filters in M X and closed subsets of X. For every set A ⊆ X, the subset of M X given by (2.1)
, and the filter F {x} is maximal for every x ∈ X. Conversely, a closed subset V F of X can be assigned to every filter
since every function a ∈ F is continuous. 
See [CDM00, Chapter 3.4] for the proof and examples of filters that are not intersections of maximal filters. Theorem 2.6(iii) establishes a one-to-one orderreversing correspondence between the set of all nonempty closed subsets of X and the set of all proper filters in M X that are intersections of maximal filters. This fact is crucial for developing a faithful generalization of the Möbius transform in Section 3.2.
Measures on MV-algebras.
Throughout this section we assume that M X is a separating clan of continuous functions over a compact Hausdorff space X. We think of the clan M X as the set of all possible coalitions arising in a game with the player set X. Plausible solutions to the game are conceived as real functionals on M X that are additive with respect to the operation ⊕. Particular classes of such functionals on MV-algebras are known as measures [BW02] and states [RM02] . Our terminology is similar to that used in [BW02] .
for every a, b ∈ M X with a b = 0. We say that a measure m is bounded if
and m is nonnegative when m(a) ≥ 0 for every a ∈ M X .
In particular, every nonnegative measure m is bounded since there is a nonnegative real α and a nonnegative measure s with s(1) = 1 such that m = αs. The condition (2.2) is a kind of additivity since Although a bounded measure on M X quantifies rather a potential profit of coalitions than that of players, Theorems 2.8 and 2.10 below guarantee that every distribution of profit among all the coalitions induces a unique distribution of wealth among all the players. Moreover, the profit distributed in this way to each coalition a ∈ M X is precisely the "mean value" of the profits assigned to the individual players with weights given by the membership degrees of all the players participating in a. Let B(X) be the σ-algebra of all Borel subsets of X. The term "measure on B(X)" stands for "σ-additive real-valued function on B(X)". We will need the following integral representation theorem arising from [Kro06, Theorem 28] 
Let μ be a regular Borel measure. Then the classical Jordan decomposition of the Borel measure μ makes it possible to write μ = μ 1 − μ 2 for two nonnegative regular Borel measures μ 1 , μ 2 . The integral
Theorem
The set of all bounded measures on M X is in a one-to-one correspondence with the set of all regular Borel measures on B(X).
Proof. If μ is a regular Borel measure on B(X), then m μ is a measure on M X . It is also bounded, since m μ can be extended to a bounded linear functional on the Banach space of all continuous functions over X with the supremum norm. Conversely, let m be a bounded measure on M X . Then Theorem 2. 
Games on MV-algebras
The set of all plausible coalitions is represented by a separating clan M X of continuous functions over X. It was emphasized in Section 2.1 that this assumption captures most structures used for modeling coalitions of players. Each coalition a ∈ M X in a game is assigned a real number, the worth of a. This assignment then determines the coalition game.
The number v(a) is the total worth generated by the players in the coalition a ∈ M X as a result of their cooperation. The main objective in coalition game theory is to find a final distribution of the profit among the players, which depends only on the results of cooperation a priori captured by the function v. In Section 2.2, we identified each such profit distribution with a bounded measure on M X .
Hence we can formalize the task of "solving" a coalition game as follows. Let Γ be a class of games on M X . A solution on Γ is a mapping σ sending every v ∈ Γ to a set σ(v) of bounded measures on M X . Various assumptions of economic and behavioral rationality lead to different solutions σ. The core is one of the most important solution concepts in coalition game theory [PS07, Section 3] . This solution will be further discussed in Section 4 (Definition 4.1), in which we apply the generalized Möbius transform, developed in the next section, to a class of games on the clan over a finite player set. The underlying idea is that an alternative representation of the game v is convenient for understanding the structure of the solution set σ(v) or for enhancing the computations with the solution set. Namely, Möbius transform is frequently used for the representation of games on the set of all subsets of a finite set [PS07, Section 8.1]. In the next section, we are going to generalize the Möbius transform to semisimple MV-algebras. The center of our interest is to find an appropriate algebra on which such generalized Möbius transform "lives".
Möbius Transform.
In his fundamental paper [Rot64] , Rota introduced the Möbius inversion formula for any locally finite partially ordered set. His approach unified the classical inclusion-exclusion principle, the number theoretic Möbius inversion, and some graph problems. For the purposes of this paper, we will confine our discussion to the algebra 2 X of all subsets of a finite set X. The chapter [PS07, Section 8] or the paper [DK00] show the important role which Möbius transform plays in cooperative game theory.
Let v be a game on the clan 2 X , where X = {1, . . . , n}. The Möbius transform of v is the only solution m : 2 X → R of the equation
We will denote the Möbius transform of v by m v . The function m v can be directly recovered from v as
Vice versa, let m : 2 X → R be such that m(∅) = 0. Put 
Then it follows that
The set
used in the summation (3.1) can be interpreted as the set of those proper filters in 2 X to which A ∈ 2 X belongs. In the next section, we will first establish a genuine MV-algebraic generalization of (3.2).
Generalized Möbius Transform.
Let M X be a separating clan of continuous functions over a compact Hausdorff space X. By K we denote the set of all compact subsets of X. For every a ∈ M X and every A ∈ K, define
In particular, if M X = 2 X with X finite, then
So (3.2) is just a special case of (3.3) since
It is useful to think of ρ a as a continuation of function a ∈ M X from X to set K. Such an interpretation is imaginable since ρ a ({x}) = a(x) for every x ∈ X. Moreover, the function ρ a will become a continuous extension of a once we introduce a suitable topology on K. In general, a rich variety of topologies on K can be induced from the topology of the underlying space X. However, the additional assumption of second-countability of the space X is later required for the existence of a generalized Consequently, the most natural choice is to endow the set K of all compact subsets of a compact Hausdorff second-countable space X with the topology given by Hausdorff distance [CV77, Chapter II.1]. Specifically, let d be any metric compatible with the topology of X. Define
The Hausdorff distance H d on K is given by
The function 
In the sections that follow, we denote by C K the clan of all continuous (in the Hausdorff metric topology) functions K → [0, 1]. The clan C K is defined analogously. It turns out that the mapping ρ :
separating clan of continuous functions over a compact Hausdorff second-countable space. For every a, b ∈
Proof. The first equality is obvious. The restriction of ρ a to K is continuous due to [Bee93, Exercise 13, p. 145]. Since the point ∅ is isolated in K, function ρ a is continuous on the whole set K.
In particular, ρ indeed extends a continuous function a ∈ M X to the continuous function ρ a ∈ C K . For every A ∈ K, the number ρ a (A) ∈ [0, 1] can be viewed as a "degree" to which a ∈ M X belongs to the filter F A generated by the compact set A (see (2.1) together with Theorem 2.6). Specifically, this means that ρ a (A) = 1 if and only if a ∈ F A .
The restriction of ρ a to C K is denoted also by ρ a .
We obtain a natural generalization of Möbius transform once we replace a measure μ on 2 A capacity on K is a function β :
A capacity β on K is called totally monotone when β is monotone and the following inequality holds true for each n ≥ 2 and every A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ K:
is a totally monotone capacity [Den97, Proposition 1.2].
Let M X be a clan of continuous functions over a compact Hausdorff space X. If β is a monotone capacity on K, then the Choquet integral of a function a ∈ M X over X with respect to β is given by
The Riemann integral on the right-hand side of (3.6) exists since the function
is well-defined (that is, a −1 ([t, 1]) ∈ K) and non-increasing.
Example 3.4. In light of Example 3.3, observe that for every A ∈ K and every a ∈ M X , (3.7)
Ca dδ A = ρ a (A).
We introduce the following notations:
the set of all nonnegative measures on the MV-algebra C K , CAP ∞ the set of all totally monotone capacities on K, B(K) theBorelσ-algebra generated by the Hausdorff metric topology on K, B(K ) theBorelσ-algebra generated by the Hausdorff metric topology on K .
Theorem 3.5. Let M X be a separating clan of continuous functions over a compact Hausdorff second-countable space X.
(i) There is an injective maping
Then Theorem 2.8 yields a unique nonnegative regular Borel measure μ m on B(K ) such that
We may think of μ m as a Borel measure on B(K) supported by a subset of K . Put (3.10)
The function β m is well-defined since the set
is closed for every A ∈ K as a consequence of Proposition 3.1(iii). It can be routinely checked that β m ∈ CAP ∞ . The mapping m → β m is injective: Theorem 2.8 says that m → μ m is a one-to-one correspondence and the mapping μ m → β m given by (3.10) is injective due to Proposition 3.1(iv). We will show that the equality (3.8) holds true. For every a ∈ M X :
where the second equality follows from (3.7) and the third from the definition of the Choquet integral. We will show that the function
is measurable with respect to the product σ-algebra B(K ) × B([0, 1]). It is enough to verify that the set 1] ). Let G 0 be a countable base for the topology of X. Then it follows that
Hence b is measurable, so the Fubini theorem can be applied to the last integral in (3.11). This gives (3.12)
Observe that, for every t ∈ [0, 1],
Therefore the Riemann integral on the right-hand side of (3.12) becomes (3.13)
where the first equality is a consequence of (3.10) and the second one follows from the definition of the Choquet integral. This finishes the proof of (i). 
Note that μ γ is necessarily supported by a subset of K . Setting μ β = β(X)μ γ , we get (3.14)
Proceeding in the same way as in (3.11)-(3.13), we come to
This concludes the proof of (ii).
(iii) We must show that the Borel measures corresponding to m and m β m via Theorem 2.8, respectively, are identical. Due to Proposition 3.2(iv), we need only to check that the two representing Borel measures agree on each set
since this is a set of generators for B(K). But this follows directly by combining (3.10) with (3.14).
The canonical example of a second-countable player set X in game theory is the continuum of players [0, 1], which was previously used in [AS74, BK93] . On the one hand, the second-countability assumption is not needed to apply the Choquet theorem in the proof above: its more general version proved recently in [Ter10] relaxes this assumption. On the other hand, this assumption made it possible to check the measurability of the function b in the proof of Theorem 3.5(i). The transformation of the integral from (3.10) to (3.13) can be formulated in the theory of random sets as a so-called Robbins' theorem [Mol05] . Now we are going to extend our investigations to the whole set of bounded measures on C K . Further notations: M(C K ) the set of all bounded measures on the MV-algebra
If α, β ∈ CAP ∞ , then it follows from the definition of the Choquet integral (3.6) that
Let β ∈ CAP. Due to the (3.15), Choquet integral of a ∈ M X with respect to β can be unambiguously defined as
It is elementary to check that the bijection established in Theorem 3.5 can be extended to M(C K ) and CAP by using (3.16) together with Theorem 2.10. Hence we obtain the final result. 
The generalized Möbius transform m δ A of v A is the integral with respect to ε
The previous example suggests a possible interpretation of the generalized Möbius transform that will be further pursued in Section 4. Namely, the values m δ A (ρ a ) are "degrees of power" of coalitions a ∈ M X in the game v A . We can think of A ∈ K as a group of "veto" players in the game v A since m δ A (ρ a ) = 1 if and only if a lies in the filter F A . [dCTM08] yields that the game v is totally monotone on (the lattice reduct of ) the MV-algebra M X . This means that v is monotone and for each n ≥ 2 and every a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ M X :
Example 3.9 implies a particular necessary condition for the existence of the generalized Möbius transform of a game v: the game v must be a difference of two totally monotone functions on M X . 
Hence the measure m has the generalized Möbius transform m μ . Since the capacity μ is additive, the unique Borel probability measure μ on K representing m μ is supported only by a subset of the set S = { {x} | x ∈ X } . Thus,
Examples of games without the generalized Möbius transform are found easily even on the clan M X = [0, 1] X , where the player set X is finite. 
for some μ 1 , μ 2 , μ 3 ∈ R. In conclusion, the equality (3.18) cannot be satisfied.
Core, Enlarged Core and Cimmino-type Algorithm
Solving a game amounts to predicting a final profit distribution among the players. It is usually assumed that all the coalitions in a game comply with the basic criteria of economical rationality. The concept of a core solution is based on two such premises:
(i) the coalition comprising all the players is formed and the players are able to redistribute its profit, (ii) no coalition will accept a smaller profit distribution than the one generated by its own members. Quoting Shapley [Sha53, p. 11] , "the core is the set of feasible outcomes that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players". These principles lead to the following definition, which unifies the concept of core for games on various coalition structures (cf. [Sha72, Aub74, AS74, BK93] ).
Definition 4.1. Let v be a game on a semisimple MV-algebra M and M(M ) be the set of all bounded measures on M . The core of the game v is the set
An empty core indicates that no coalitions are able to arrive at any agreement about the joint distribution of profits. The question of non-emptiness of the core is omnipresent in coalition game theory. This question is non-trivial even for games on the clan 2 X with the finite player set X: the core of any game on 2 X is the intersection of an affine hyperplane with 2 |X| − 2 half-spaces in
with X finite, then a fortiori, checking non-emptiness is hard as the core is the intersection of infinitely-many half-spaces and affine hyperplanes. Properties of the core solution for games on [0, 1] X were, among others, studied by Aubin [Aub74] and Azrieli and Lehrer [AL07] . In Section 4.2, we will apply the generalized Möbius transform to checking nonemptiness of the core. In particular, the proposed procedure will always find at least one profit distribution provided the core is not empty. The procedure utilizes a bargaining power of coalitions introduced in the next section.
Enlarged Core.
We consider a negotiation scheme for a game v whose aim is to reach a consensus. The consensus in the game is any distribution of profit lying in the core C(v). We will confine our discussion to the finite player set X. n , which corresponds to a unique vector x ∈ R n . Thus M(M X ) = R n . Let ., . be the standard scalar product of vectors in R n . Then we can express the core C(v) of any game v on [0, 1] n as
Then we can write
The concept of an enlarged core was proposed in [BK09] as a solution for games on [0, 1] n . While the core of v is the set of common points of all the sets C a (v), the enlarged core of v will be defined as the set of points in R n belonging to all but "negligibly many" sets C a (v). What "negligible" means depends on the assessment of the bargaining power of coalitions a ∈ [0, 1] n in the given game.
Definition 4.2. A coalitional assessment of a game v on [0, 1] n is a complete probability measure P defined on the σ-algebra A of the Lebesgue measurable subsets of [0, 1] n .
For each A ∈ A, the number P (A) can be thought of as a relative degree of influence of the coalitions in A ∈ A on the final distribution of profit in the game v. If P (A) = 0, then the set A of coalitions has a negligible impact on the bargaining about distributions of profit. Hence the conditions imposed by C a (v) can be disregarded for each a ∈ A when P (A) = 0. This naturally leads to the following definition.
Definition 4.3. The enlarged core in the game v with a coalitional assessment P is the set
It is clear that
It can happen that C P (v) is much larger than C(v) for a game v and a coalitional assessment P [BK09, Example 3]. Interestingly enough, the existence of the nonnegative generalized Möbius transform of a game v yields a large class of coalitional assessments for which the inclusion (4.1) can be strengthened to an identity. 
Proof. As β is totally monotone, the generalized Möbius transform m β of v is indeed nonnegative (Example 3.9). Since m β is nonnegative and nonzero, we may suppose without loss of generality that
The function μ β is nonnegative and sums to one over all the vertices of the ncube [0, 1] n except the origin. Hence it can be seen as a probability measure on A supported by a subset of {0, 1}
n . Assume that λ is any complete probability measure on A such that λ(A) > 0 for every nonempty open set A ⊆ [0, 1] n . Case in point: consider the Lebesgue measure on A. Let α ∈ (0, 1). Then the function
is a coalitional assessment on A satisfying P (A) > 0 whenever A ∈ A is open or A contains the vector 1. The conclusion C(v) = C P (v) is then a consequence of Theorem 1 in [BK93] , which says that the existence of P with those properties is sufficient for the equality in (4.1).
The class of games v on [0, 1] n satisfying (4.2) is easily described. For each a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ [0, 1] n , let π be a permutation of {1, . . . , n} such that
Put a π(0) = 0. Then
4.2. Bargaining Schemes. The concepts of enlarged core and coalitional assessment are, together with Theorem 4.4, main ingredients in introducing the socalled bargaining schemes for games on [0, 1] n , which were proposed by Butnariu and the author in [BK09] .
Definition 4.5. A bargaining scheme for the core (or for the enlarged core) is an iterative procedure that (i) starts from an arbitrarily chosen initial distribution of profit x 0 ∈ R n among the players, (ii) generates a sequence (x k ) k∈N in R n converging to a point of the core or the enlarged core, provided such a point exists.
In this context, each vector x k+1 is seen as a redistribution of wealth emerging as the result of a bargaining process in which the terms of the distribution of wealth x k are renegotiated at each step k according to specific rules. These rules are determined by the Cimmino-style procedure [Cim38] generating the sequence (x k ) k∈N . Finding an element of the core is thus interpreted as a convex feasibility problem [BB96] in which the number of conditions is infinite. The algorithm, which was originally developed in [BS08] , is designed as follows.
We consider a game v on [0, 1] n meeting the assumptions of Theorem 4.4 and a coalitional assessment P from the conclusion of the same theorem. This implies that C(v) = C P (v). Let p a (x) be the metric projection of x ∈ R n onto the set C a (v), which is given by Then the nonnegative function g is everywhere finite, convex, and continuously differentiable with ∇g(x) = p(x) − x. The behavior of g with respect to a sequence (x k ) k∈N indicates the speed of convergence of the sequence (x k ) k∈N to a point in C(v). The two most important cases are singled out. These two criteria thus enable us to determine nonemptiness of the core or to find an element from the core. The examples of runs of this procedure together with a discussion of emerging computational issues can be found in [BK09] .
Open Problems
The existence of the generalized Möbius transform is proven only for a class of games defined on a clan over a compact Hausdorff second-countable space (cf. Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.6). The second-countability assumption was a key component in the proof of Theorem 3.5, which enabled the representation of the Choquet integral by way of the Fubini theorem in (3.12). It is an interesting question whether the second-countability assumption can be relaxed in the statement of Theorem 3.5.
To the best of the author's knowledge, the application of the Möbius transform to Cimmino-style projection techniques has not previously appeared in the literature. In Section 4, we investigated such an application for games with finitely many players. The restriction to clans over a finite set was necessary to utilize the result from [BK09] that the core and the enlarged core coincide for specific coalitional assessments in games with finitely many players (see the proof of Theorem 4.4). It is therefore an open problem whether or not the presented approach to the Cimmino-style bargaining scheme can also be carried over to games with infinitely many players.
